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ARTICLE
MIGRATION AND SYSTEMS COMPETITION:
A CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE1
PHILIP HANKE* & KLAUS HEINE**
INTRODUCTION
Modern society is characterized by increasing mobility of both capital
and labor. Local communities, regions, and countries are in a constant com-
petition for those production factors. Location decisions of firms, but also
of individuals, are a central driving force for policy design at different
levels of government.2 On the capital side, the regulation of subsidies or
other benefits given to incentivize firms to relocate create a wider constitu-
tional order, through which inter-jurisdictional competition takes place. Eu-
ropean State Aid law and WTO subsidy law are examples of such a
regulation.3 On the side of labor, there is an intricate framework of legal
provisions restricting or enabling the movement of individuals across inter-
national borders, or at times even within a country. They establish an order,
or a set of rules, through which open economies interact. Jurisdictions relate
to each other in a cooperative, but also competitive way. For instance, there
is international cooperation with regard to refugees (be it to avoid their
entry or to redistribute them among countries), but there is also competition
1. Paper presented at the Christian Kirchner Memorial Symposium, September 6, 2014, at
the University of St. Thomas School of Law.
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2. See generally Horst Siebert, Locational Competition: A Neglected Paradigm in the Inter-
national Division of Labour, 29 THE WORLD ECON. 137 (2006) (examining the concept of loca-
tional competition and its implications for firms and governments).
3. See generally Kenneth P. Thomas, COMPETING FOR CAPITAL: EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA IN A GLOBAL AREA (2000) (comparing EU regulation of state aid to business with virtu-
ally unregulated investment competition in North America); see also Alan O. Sykes, The Ques-
tionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEG. ANAL. 473 (2010)
(evaluating WTO subsidy laws).
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for highly-skilled or rich migrants, with some countries even offering citi-
zenship for immigrants who either bring talent or investments.4
Although the inter-jurisdictional competition between countries is ap-
parent, the process of institutionalization of a constitutional order regulating
that competition is in its infancy. With increasing regional and bilateral in-
tegration, the framework for such competition is laid. The European Union
can be seen as such an example, as can federally-organized countries such
as the United States or Canada. Such frameworks regulating regulatory or
inter-jurisdictional competition that have been studied so far are most nota-
bly in the area of corporate law.5 The debate generally revolves around
questions concerning when decentralized decision-making is superior to
centralization and under what conditions such competitive frameworks suc-
ceed or fail.
Finding an optimal constitutional order—that is, an overarching frame-
work—for migration is non-trivial and goes beyond the debate in corporate
law. Migration policy can be seen as a problem of constitutional choice
because it relates “to the choice of the ‘rules of the game’ that citizens are
willing to live by.”6 Standard economics theorists (especially those in the
sub-field of trade theory) would argue that open borders with free move-
ment of workers are a precondition for an efficient allocation of productive
resources. Economic theories of federalism and welfare-enhancing, inter-
jurisdictional competition are based on the assumption that consumer-voters
are mobile. Yet migration involves more than just an allocation of produc-
tion factors. As the Swiss writer Max Frisch famously said, “We asked for
workers, but human beings came.”7 Economic theory argues that in the
presence of externalities—that is, effects on third parties—legal interven-
tions are justified. Although restrictive migration laws create market distor-
tions and cause welfare losses, there are other aspects to consider. First,
there is the effect of migration on rigid labor markets. Second, there are the
consequences for the welfare state and its fiscal balance. These concerns
can potentially lead to a collapse of systems competition.8 With a sub-opti-
mal institutional design, welfare losses might prevail instead of welfare
gains.
4. See generally Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Compet-
itive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006) (discussing the competitive hiring prac-
tices for highly-skilled immigrants).
5. See, e.g., Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter & Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competi-
tion in EU Corporate Law After Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s Product for Europe, 2 EUR.
CO. FIN. L. REV. 159 (2005).
6. Gabriele Orcalli, Constitutional Choice and European Immigration Policy, 18 CONST.
POLITICAL ECON. 1, 2 (2007).
7. See Max Frisch, Vorwort, in SIAMO ITALIANI – DIE ITALIENER. GESPR ¨ACHE MIT ITALIENIS-
CHEN ARBEITERN IN DER SCHWEIZ (Alexander J. Seiler ed., 1965).
8. See generally Hans-Werner Sinn, The Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems
Competition, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 247 (1997) (evaluating different paths to market failure due to
government influence).
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The topic becomes even more complex once it is observed that some
of the theoretical predictions fail to come true. The theorem of factor price
equalization suggests that wages for identical jobs in two countries with
liberalized trade (e.g., through NAFTA or European integration) tend to
approach each other.9 Yet full convergence in wages and living standards
due to migration has not taken place. The differences in hourly wages
among European countries are still substantial.10 Interestingly, even an abo-
lition of legal restrictions on migration does not lead to the migration levels
that one might expect. For instance, Puerto Ricans, being U.S. citizens, are
free to move to the contiguous states. In fact, since the end of World War II,
one-third of Puerto Ricans have chosen to do so.11 But this also means that
two-thirds have chosen not to move and rather preferred to stay on an island
where the 2012 average annual earnings of workers in production occupa-
tions was around thirty-five percent below the U.S. average.12 This might
seem puzzling at first, but it serves as a reminder that differences in wage
levels are not the sole determinant of migration decisions. Indeed, factors
like social networks or the political environment in the destination country
affect these decisions as well.13
Migration policy is usually discussed in the setting of national policy.
This article, however, views migration regimes from the perspective of in-
ter-jurisdictional competition and discusses under which conditions such a
framework can be welfare-enhancing. In this view, migration (“exit”) can
be a factor contributing to the better functioning of institutions and the sys-
tem as a whole and relates also to another instrument, namely the articula-
tion of protest (“voice”). Section I gives an overview of legal regimes in
place. Section II discusses the possible benefits from migration. Section III
focuses on the potential reasons for a sub-optimal allocation of resources,
and Section IV presents solutions to these problems. Finally, Section V
revisits the systems competition view of migration by not only looking at
the mobility of people, but also their possibilities of express discontent with
the performance of the jurisdiction they live in or want to live in.
I. MANAGING MIGRATION FLOWS
Migration is currently managed through a variety of legal mechanisms.
While every country has immigration laws and related regulations, the ap-
9. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, International Trade and the Equalisation of Factor
Prices, 58 THE ECON. J. 163 (1948) (analyzing theories regarding the equalization of factor prices
across country borders); Abba P. Lerner, Factor Prices and International Trade, 19 ECONOMICA 1
(1952) (exploring different factors that influence factor prices in different countries).
10. See Hans-Werner Sinn & Wolfgang Ochel, Social Union, Convergence and Migration,
41 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 869, 884–87 (2003).
11. GEORGE J. BORJAS, IMMIGRATION ECONOMICS 34–35 (2014).
12. Id.
13. Jennifer Fitzgerald, David Leblang & Jessica C. Teets, Defying the Law of Gravity: The
Political Economy of International Migration, 66 WORLD POLIT. 406, 407 (2014).
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proaches taken in these laws vary from country to country. The United
States, for instance, relies on quota-based systems, which is de facto tanta-
mount to the federal government setting the supply of labor that businesses
can tap.14 Other countries (e.g., Canada and Australia) select potential im-
migrants by awarding points for certain characteristics, such as language
proficiency, family ties, or professional training.15 This too means that there
is a bureaucracy making decisions regarding the supply of labor. In general,
national migration laws tend to be skill-biased and give preference to highly
skilled individuals.16
In addition to national law, there is a growing body of international
law providing channels for migration. At the bilateral level, there are migra-
tion agreements, many of which are inspired by the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) Model Agreement on Temporary and Permanent
Employment.17 Bilateral migration agreements can link various issues re-
lated to migration (e.g., admission, return, visa policy, border security, etc.).
Furthermore, recent free trade agreements attempt to not only liberalize
trade in goods, but also in services.18 They therefore contain provisions on
labor mobility, mostly for highly-skilled individuals who provide their ser-
vices across international borders. In doing so, they slightly correct the
skill-bias present in national migration law.19 Furthermore, there are techni-
cal agreements dealing with, for instance, the repatriation of individuals and
visa policies.20
At the multilateral level, although there is no comprehensive conven-
tion on migration and no general customary or conventional legal obliga-
tions preventing states from denying foreigners access to their labor
markets, there are several treaties pertaining to migration. For instance, the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees gives special rights—that is,
the right to asylum—to people who are persecuted in their home country.21
With regard to labor migration, the General Agreement on Trade of Ser-
14. Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 271, 272–74 (2003).
15. Id.
16. PHILIP MARTIN, MANOLO ABELLA & CHRISTIANE KUPTSCH, MANAGING LABOR MIGRA-
TION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 55 (2006); LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME:
BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON GLOBAL LABOR MOBILITY xii (2006).
17. International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Recommendation (Re-
vised), 1949 (No. 86), at VIII(2), 32nd ILC session (July 1, 1949).
18. Marion Panizzon, International Law of Economic Migration: A Me´nage a` Trois? GATS
Mode 4, EPAs, and Bilateral Migration Agreements, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 1207, 1231–32 (2010).
19. Marion Panizzon, Migration and Trade: Prospects for Bilateralism in the Face of Skill-
Selective Mobility Laws, 12 MELB. J. INT’L. L. 95, 106–07 (2011).
20. See Florian Trauner & Imke Kruse, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements:
A New Standard EU Foreign Policy Tool?, 10 EUR. J. MIGR. & L. 411, 429 (2008).
21. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
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vices (GATS),22 which is an inherent part of the WTO system, distinguishes
between four modes of providing services across borders. One of them (re-
ferred to as Mode 4)23 relates to individuals crossing borders in order to
perform a service. Thus, state commitments under the GATS entitle certain
service providers to move across borders, at least on a temporary basis.
There are basic human rights provisions that at least allow for leaving
a country (albeit not to enter another). Article 13(2) of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has the right to leave any coun-
try, including his own, and to return to his country.”24 This principle is also
stated in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own”),25
although some exceptions apply. A special case is the situation of stateless
persons. This group of people, who are not necessarily refugees or even
migrants, receive some protection through the Statelessness Status Conven-
tion of 195426 and the subsequent Statelessness Reduction Convention of
1961,27 although both conventions sport only a relatively small number of
ratifications (sixty-six and thirty-eight, respectively). Although they do not
address rules on admission, there are conventions providing rights for mi-
grants (or migrant workers more specifically) such as the Migration for Em-
ployment Convention of 1949,28 the Migrant Workers (Supplementary
Provisions) Convention of 1975,29 and the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families.30 These conventions have not been very successful in terms of
numbers of signatories, especially since the high-income countries were
rather reluctant to enter these agreements.31 The conclusion from this is that
although migrants benefit from a range of human rights stemming from
customary or conventional law once they arrive in their state of destination,
22. General Agreement on Trade in Services Annex 1B, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183,
33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
23. Id. at art. I(2)(d).
24. Universal Decl. of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 13(2), U.N. Doc A/810; GAOR,
3d Sess. (Dec. 12, 1948).
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(2), opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976–Mar. 28,
1979).
26. See Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signature Sept. 28,
1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force Jun. 6, 1960).
27. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, opened for signature Aug. 30, 1961,
989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975).
28. Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised), opened for signature Jul.
1, 1949, 20 U.N.T.S. 79, (entered into force Jan. 22, 1952).
29. Convention (No. 143) Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion
of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, June 24, 1975, 1120 U.N.T.S. 323.
30. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
31. JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION 178–81
(2009).
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international law provides virtually no rights to admission into a country
other than their country of citizenship.32 In other words, there is no global
consensus that migration might be a welfare-enhancing element of inter-
jurisdictional competition and that a broader institutional framework above
the level of national migration laws might be needed.
The situation presents itself differently at the regional level. Regional
integration can also be linked to liberalization of labor migration. The Euro-
pean Union (EU), for instance, recognizes the fundamental freedom of
movement, and the Schengen Agreement, a stand-alone compact that subse-
quently merged into EU law with the Lisbon reform of the Union, abolished
border controls among signatory states.33 EU citizens, unless they pose an
excessive burden on the welfare system of the recipient state, are entitled to
live in any EU member state and can travel among Schengen states without
showing their identification at the border. Based on bilateral agreements
with the EU, Switzerland, which is not a member of the EU, uses employ-
ers, rather than a bureaucracy, as gatekeepers. EU citizens willing to move
to Switzerland are entitled to do so once they can produce a valid labor
contract with a Swiss employer. To a much lesser extent than the EU free-
dom of movement or the movement between the EU and some of its neigh-
bors, NAFTA grants rights to temporary employment of certain groups of
professionals and other workers.34 Migration is thus regulated using a large
variety of legal instruments and through various forums.
II. THE BENEFITS OF MIGRATION
From an economic point of view, migration increases efficiency
through a plethora of mechanisms. Most of the economic literature on mi-
gration focuses on the theory of international factor mobility and primarily
sees migration as being stimulated by favorable conditions in the country of
destination,35 particularly in terms of relative deprivation.36
32. Id.
33. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2014).
34. For comparisons between the EU and NAFTA, see, e.g., Christopher J. Cassise, The
European Union v. the United States under the NAFTA: A Comparative Analysis of the Free
Movement of Persons within the Regions, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1343 (1995), and M. Jeanette
Yakamavich, NAFTA on the Move: The United States and Mexico on a Journey toward the Free
Movement of Workers—A NAFTA Progress Report and EU Comparison, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM.
463 (2002).
35. See Arye L. Hillman & Avi Weiss, Beyond International Factor Movements: Cultural
Preferences, Endogenous Policies and the Migration of People: An Overview, in MIGRATION, THE
CONTROVERSIES AND THE EVIDENCE 76, 87–88 (Riccardo Faini, Jaime de Melo & Klaus F. Zim-
mermann eds., 1999).
36. See generally Oded Stark & J. Edward Taylor, Migration Incentives, Migration Types:
The Role of Relative Deprivation, 101 THE ECON. J. 1163 (1991) (discussing the role of relative
deprivation in the decision to emigrate from one’s home country).
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By migrating toward similarly-skilled workers in a different city or
country, people can live up to the full potential of their skills.37 A trained
investment banker will be less productive in a rural area than if he or she
were to live close to Wall Street. The same is true for skills that are comple-
mentary to the skills prevalent in any given place. For example, a center for
journalism could also attract people trained in film productions. These so-
called agglomeration economies are closely linked to the core-periphery
model, in which the economic core area attracts economic activity from the
periphery.
A concern voiced in the literature is the negative effects of “brain
drain.” If highly-skilled individuals are enabled to move from a developing
country to a high-income country, then the former loses the investment in
human capital while the latter reaps the benefits of this investment without
contributing its share.38 The counter-argument revolves around the payment
of remittances; immigrants tend to send substantial amounts of money back
to their families in the country of origin.39
Another important aspect is the shift in immigration patterns. While
migration used to be permanent (e.g., the flows of immigrants from Europe
to the United States in the nineteenth century), modern migration tends to
be more and more temporary in nature.40 Labor migration thus is more
likely to follow the pattern of job mobility. In fact, migration can be more
complex. The concept of “circular migration” can be understood to encom-
pass not only temporary and permanent migration, but also permanent or
temporary return to the country of origin.41 The conclusion is that migra-
tion—if managed correctly—leads or should lead to a so-called “triple win”
for the host country, the country of origin, and the migrants themselves.
The final verdict is not yet in on all aspects of the economics of migra-
tion, including those mentioned above. George Borjas identifies a series of
issues.42 For example, it is not fully understood how individuals self-select
into becoming either movers or stayers. Neither is it understood what deter-
mines the speed of economic assimilation in the host country. Different
empirical studies come to radically different results regarding the impact of
migration on the wage structure. Generally, the full scope of adjustments
37. MASAHISA FUJITA, PAUL R. KRUGMAN & ANTHONY VENABLES, THE SPATIAL ECONOMY:
CITIES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1999).
38. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Koichi Hamada, The Brain Drain, International Integration of
Markets for Professionals and Unemployment: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. DEV. ECON. 19 (1974).
39. C¸AGLAR ¨OZDEN & MAURICE W. SCHIFF, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, REMITTANCES, AND
THE BRAIN DRAIN 53 (2006).
40. MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (2003), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/circular-migra
tion-keeping-development-rolling.
41. See Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias & Kathleen Newland, Circular Migration and Develop-
ment: Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (2007), http://migra
tionpolicy.org/research/circular-migration-and-development-trends-policy-routes-and-ways-for
ward.
42. BORJAS, supra note 11, at 212–15.
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taking place in an economy as a result of migration, such as the production
method, the location of firms, or the occupational mobility of individuals, is
still elusive. Therefore, the actual adjustment costs caused by migration are
widely unknown. There are also discussions on the benefits of migration,
especially regarding the question under which conditions the native popula-
tion enjoys a net benefit after all adjustments and costs incurred thereby.43
The economics literature on migration has also had a hard time explaining
how immigration policy choices are made. Also, the very long-term effects,
mostly regarding the integration of immigrants into society over the genera-
tions, are not yet understood at a satisfying level.44
From the systems competition point of view, there are several mecha-
nisms in place involving migration. The act of “voting with the feet” is at
the cornerstone of the Tiebout model—by leaving their jurisdiction, indi-
viduals match their preferences with the provision of bundles of taxes and
public goods available elsewhere.45 As a result, it is possible to provide
public goods even through a decentralized mechanism. The subsequent
literature developed this static model in which individuals are matched to a
disinterested jurisdiction of their preference into a model of active inter-
jurisdictional competition, in which local governments compete for re-
sources.46 Even though governments might not be in a strong enough posi-
tion to actively contribute to the competition, they are nevertheless
implicitly part of it and constrained in their actions (e.g., their tax rates) by
its presence.47
Another way of seeing inter-jurisdictional competition is the concept
of “yardstick competition” suggested by Pierre Salmon—individuals do not
need to actually move to a different place; instead, they can observe policies
implemented elsewhere, and if they think that such policies would be in
their interest, demand similar ones from the governing politicians.48 This
approach is similar to Albert O. Hirschman’s dichotomy of exit and voice
as reaction to decaying institutions, which emphasizes how “exit,” that is,
43. See id. at 149–69; see also George J. Borjas, The Economic Benefits from Immigration, 9
J. ECON. PERSPECT. 3 (1995) (expanding on the hypothesis that immigration policy increases the
national income of natives); see also Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency and Distribu-
tional Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility: Calculations and Policy Implica-
tions, 14 J. DEV. ECON. 61 (1984) (discussing the relationship between costs and gains for native
countries based on recent international policy changes).
44. BORJAS, supra note 11, at 214.
45. C.M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLIT. ECON. 416, 417–18
(1956).
46. See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition among Jurisdictions:
Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333–54 (1988); Aid to States and
Localities and the Appropriate Competitive Framework, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 153 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
47. See Daphne A. Kenyon, Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition, NEW ENG. ECON.
REV. 13 (1997).
48. See Pierre Salmon, Decentralization as an Incentive Scheme, 3 OXF. REV. ECON. POLICY
24, 32 (1987).
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the act of leaving, contributes to the improvement of a jurisdiction’s gov-
ernance.49 The pressure of a mass exodus can lead to policy reform. Migra-
tion can also solve the fundamental political dilemma of any economic
system formulated by Barry Weingast: “A government strong enough to
protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to confis-
cate the wealth of its citizens.”50 The ability to leave limits the extortive
power of the state.
A jurisdiction can also be interpreted as a club. In this view, a club is
“a voluntary group deriving mutual benefit from sharing one or more of the
following: production costs, the members’ characteristics, or a good charac-
terized by excludable benefits.”51 The members of a club have an interest in
others joining the club (by analogy, nobody would want to be the sole
member of a tennis club), while keeping the right to prevent any further
influx if there is overcrowding of the shared resource. A seminal paper by
J.M. Buchanan shows that members of a club solve optimization problems
and set membership rules as well as the level of provision of the shared
good accordingly.52
In the spirit of these models, jurisdictions could be seen as clubs, with
infrastructure being the shared good within that club. Such reasoning can be
found in the political debate. For instance, the Swiss electorate recently
rejected a popular initiative (referendum) that sought to limit immigration
to a bare minimum.53 The referendum was initiated by an environmentalist
organization (Ecopop), which argued that overpopulation in the world in
general, and in Switzerland specifically, is a pivotal issue and that the num-
ber of people living in Switzerland has to be reduced as it leads to an over-
usage of limited resources.54 The initiative failed at the ballots, mostly be-
cause the economic effects would have been disastrous. Earlier in 2014, the
electorate accepted a similar initiative, which had a more xenophobic and
less environmentalist tone. This initiative amended the constitution and re-
quired the government to set quotas on immigration, even if originated from
49. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3–5 (1970) [hereinafter HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOY-
ALTY]; see generally Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic
Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History, 45 WORLD POLITICS 173 (1993) (detailing the relation-
ship between “exit” and “voice”) [hereinafter Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and the GDR].
50. Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving Fed-
eralism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1 (1995).
51. Todd Sandler & John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Sur-
vey, 18 J. ECON. LIT. 1481, 1482 (1980).
52. See J.M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1, 1–14 (1965).
53. See Bundesratsbeschluss u¨ber das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 30. November
2014 [Ruling of the Federal Government on the Result of the Referendum Held on Nov. 30,
2014], BBl 2015 1813 (Switz.).
54. See Botschaft zur Volksinitiative <<Stopp der ¨Uberbevo¨lkerung – zur Sicherung der
Natu¨rlichen Lebensgrundlagen>> [Communication of the Federal Government on the Popular Ini-
tiative “Stop Overpopulation – for the Protection of Natural Livelihood”], BBl 2013 8693
(Switz.).
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the EU,55 in crass contradiction to the bilateral agreements between Swit-
zerland and the EU, which provide for the free movement of people with a
labor contract or sufficient means for subsistence.56 Yet analyzing the op-
timality just from the inside of a club is not enough, and the theory of clubs
has not stopped there. Subsequent models incorporated the welfare of both
members just as well as of nonmembers of a club (i.e., the total economy
point of view).57 In other words, there is a trade-off between the collective
rights of groups to shield themselves against outsiders and the individual
human right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Most theories of inter-jurisdictional competition revolve around the ef-
fect of (potential) exit on the quality of institutions and the provision of an
attractive bundle of taxes and public goods. However, and this shall be dis-
cussed in further detail in Section IV, it is to be noted that exit can drive out
voice and that the latter can play just as important of a role as the former.
III. THE WELFARE STATE AND THE LABOR MARKET
Migration can cause redistributional issues. Even if the net benefits are
positive—and this is a widespread conclusion in the economics literature—
it can nevertheless be argued that there are winners and losers from migra-
tion. Virtually every country in the Western world has some kind of income
redistribution mechanism.
The Tiebout model mentioned above—that is, the procedure of “voting
with feet”—would at first mean that individuals who prefer redistribution
would move to a jurisdiction with a well-developed welfare system, while
individuals who prefer otherwise would rather settle in a so-called “night
watchman state.” Any jurisdictions that do not find people willing to live
within their boundaries would be forced to adjust to the demand. This
model only works in the so-called “pre-constitutive phase”—that is, behind
the veil of ignorance. Only as long as people do not know whether they
would be on the giving or the receiving end of the welfare state does voting
with feet make sense. Otherwise, any welfare state would collapse, as the
wealthy people move to states without redistribution. Adverse selection
leads to the collapse of welfare states, and inter-jurisdictional competition
in this setting is efficiency-reducing.58
55. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION]  Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 121a (Switz.).
56. See Abkommen Zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft Einerseits und der
Europa¨ischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten Andererseits u¨ber die Freizu¨gigkeit [Agree-
ment between the Swiss Federation and the European Union and its Member States on the Free
Movement of Persons], June 21, 1999 (entered into force June 1, 2002).
57. See, e.g., Sandler and Tschirhart, supra note 51; see also Todd Sandler & John Tschir-
hart, Club Theory: Thirty Years Later, 93 PUB. CHOICE 335, 335–55 (1997).
58. See Hans Werner Sinn, Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe, 34 EUR.
ECON. REV. 489, 489–504 (1990).
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Whether welfare states act as “magnets”59 is subject to a debate with
mixed empirical findings. This ambiguity is also reflected in public opinion
towards immigration60—the “gap” hypothesis postulates a significant diver-
gence between public opinion, which demands more restrictive migration
policies and the relatively more liberal immigration policy outcomes.61 An
empirical assessment has to deal with a variety of factors, such as the fact
that the structure of migrant populations, their skill sets, and their education
levels (and thus migrants’ propensity to receive welfare payments) varies
from country to country. Also, the structure of welfare systems can be dif-
ferent, with different mixes of contributory and non-contributory support
schemes observable around the world. It can be argued that the structure of
the welfare system—depending on the country’s legal immigration
scheme—could affect the skill composition of immigrants. Low-skilled mi-
gration will be relatively more common if there are no restrictions on mi-
gration, as voters will prefer an immigration policy with a high-skills bias
(as these migrants contribute more to the welfare state, who in turn will
avoid high-tax countries).62
More specifically, there is a controversy as to the net effect of migrants
on the fiscal balance.63 One argument is that if the welfare state does not
discriminate between new arrivals and longer-term residents, there is ineffi-
cient migration into the welfare systems of higher-income countries.64 The
counter-argument is that generally migrants are excluded from many wel-
fare payments, but are obliged to pay taxes on their earnings. Again, the
precise institutional framework matters.
Here, an important difference between the U.S. and Europe becomes
apparent. Since Western European countries tend to boast more generous
welfare systems and more rigid labor markets with relatively higher unem-
ployment rates, resistance to immigration in the EU is higher than in the
United States.65 It is disputed to what degree the availability of welfare
payments plays a role in the decision to relocate. There is empirical evi-
59. See George J. Borjas, Immigration and Welfare Magnets, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 607, 608
(1999).
60. See, e.g., Amelie F. Constant & Klaus F. Zimmermann, Migration and Ethnicity: An
Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION 13, 13–35 (Ame-
lie F. Constant & Klaus F. Zimmermann eds., 2014).
61. See Marc R. Rosenblum & Wayne A. Cornelius, Dimensions of Immigration Policy, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 246, 246–73 (Marc R.
Rosenblum & Daniel J. Tichenor eds., 2012).
62. Assaf Razin & Jackline Wahba, Welfare Magnet Hypothesis, Fiscal Burden and Immi-
gration Skill Selectivity (2011), https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/17515.html.
63. For an extensive survey, see Corrado Giulietti & Jackline Wahba, Welfare Migration, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION 489, 489–504 (Amelie Constant
& Klaus F. Zimmermann eds., 2014).
64. See Sinn & Ochel, supra note 10.
65. See Jørgen Drud Hansen, Immigration and Income Redistribution in Welfare States, 19
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 735, 735–46 (2003).
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dence claiming that immigrants to the U.S. are clustered in states with rela-
tively higher benefits, whereas native-born welfare receivers are not—that
is, that the geographic sorting of immigrants in the U.S. is altered by wel-
fare benefits.66 That this happens to a larger extent with immigrants than
with native-born individuals can be explained by the fact that migrants al-
ready have to bear the cost of migrating from their home country to the U.S.
Thus, they relatively inexpensively choose among places to settle within the
U.S., whereas relocating only pays off for natives if the additional welfare
benefits exceed the costs of moving. However, it is not necessarily correct
to conclude that there is inefficient migration into welfare systems—that is,
that people who move to the United States would not have migrated if there
were no welfare programs. An issue could just as well be that people who
would re-migrate to a different place would rather stay where they are be-
cause of the welfare payments they can receive there.67 With respect to the
differences between the EU and the U.S., it is also important to note that
migrants moving to the U.S. are relatively highly educated as compared to
those moving to Europe.68
The question of inefficient migration into welfare systems has not only
been studied from an economic point of view but also addressed by legal
reforms. European Law closed the gap regarding welfare systems, an issue
that became important with the accession of several Eastern European
countries in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, together with Cyprus and Malta), 2007 (Bulga-
ria and Romania), and most recently 2013 (Croatia). These countries were
and still are substantially poorer than Western European countries and ex-
hibit less-developed welfare systems. In 2004, the EU adopted Regulation
No. 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems.69 Article 4,
headed “Equality of Treatment,” stipulated that, “Unless otherwise pro-
vided for by this Regulation, persons to whom this Regulation applies shall
enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the
legislation of any Member State as the nationals thereof.”70
In a recent court case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) unequivo-
cally made it clear that States can nevertheless impose restrictions on the
access to “special non-contributory cash benefits” by EU citizens.71 The
legal question at hand was whether the equal treatment requirement of Arti-
cle 4 of Regulation 883 only applies to nationals of other EU Member
66. See Borjas, supra note 59.
67. Id. at 608.
68. Jeffrey Grogger & Gordon H. Hanson, Income Maximization and the Selection and Sort-
ing of International Migrants, 95 J. DEV. ECON. 42, 50–51 (2010).
69. Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the Coordination of Social Security Systems, 2004 O.J. (L 166) 1.
70. Id.
71. See Case C333/13, Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig (2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.
jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C333/13&td=ALL.
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States if their residence complies with the conditions of the Directive on
free movement of EU citizens.72 Under this Directive, EU Member States
are not obliged to award welfare payments during the first three months of a
person’s residence in that state. If an economically inactive person remains
in the Member State for a period of three months to five years, then he or
she needs to prove that he or she has sufficient resources to support him or
herself in order to receive the right of residence. This system is a legal
implementation of the principle that migration solely for the purpose of
acquiring social assistance is inefficient from an economic point of view.
The ECJ found that Member States have the right to exclude individuals
from certain “special non-contributory cash benefits” if they do not have a
right of residence under the Directive on free movement of EU citizens—
that is, if they established residence in the Member State only to receive
social payments. In its ruling, the ECJ de facto re-asserted the principle
proposed by Hans-Werner Sinn73 in that it allowed for the discrimination
between nationals from the host country and nationals from other EU coun-
tries. Similar legislation also exists in the U.S. with the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,74 (PRWORA),
which bars most immigrants from federal income assistance programs dur-
ing their first five years of residence. It also allows states to extend this
exclusionary period.
Recent legal developments seem to change the nature of migration and
its effect on the welfare state. With the liberalization of the provision of
services across international borders, new channels for migration open up.
Individuals can enter labor markets as service providers instead of immi-
grants. An important difference is that service providers are usually not eli-
gible for the same kinds of benefits as permanent residents. Labor
immigration policy usually has to decide on two parameters: the number of
migrants admitted and the rights given to them after admission.75 The men-
tioned developments tip this balance towards possibly higher numbers with
fewer rights.
Rigid labor markets have difficulties adjusting to the influx of new
workers. Such rigidities occur for two reasons. First, labor relationships are
by their nature generally longer-term contracts. This has to do with the costs
of training new workers. Even if there are no legal barriers and even with
72. Directive 2004/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the
Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the
Territory of the Member States Amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and Repealing Council
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/
EEC, 90/365/EEC, 93/96/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77.
73. See Sinn & Ochel, supra note 10.
74. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–193, 110 Stat. 2105.
75. See Martin Ruhs & Philip Martin, Numbers vs. Rights: Trade Offs and Guest Worker
Programs, 42 INT’L. MIGRATION REV. 249, 249–65 (2008).
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high unemployment, replacing a highly specialized worker comes at an ex-
pense and can take a substantial amount of time and resources. Second,
some rigidities are imposed by legal measures aiming to protect workers
from exploitation and economic hardship.
IV. SOLUTIONS
The previous Section III discussed the potential problems for systems
competition with migration. This Section IV presents some solutions—al-
though not all of them, as will be shown, produce the desired outcome.
A straightforward solution to the problem of inefficient migration into
welfare systems would be to reduce the scope of welfare payments.76 This
poses a serious problem of conflicting interests. After all, it can be argued
that in countries with developed welfare states, there are majority popula-
tions in favor of such systems. Thus, reducing the size of the welfare state
solely in order to prevent its abuse would be overshooting. Another possi-
bility is to centralize the welfare state at the federal level (e.g., by creating a
unified European unemployment insurance system). In this case, movement
between jurisdictions would be neutral in its effect on the welfare system.
Alternatively, jurisdictions could harmonize their handout systems (social
assistance would still be administered at the local level, but instead accord-
ing to harmonized payment levels, rules, and criteria). Both of these latter
suggestions come with an important caveat—they only work when the in-
come levels among jurisdictions are not too different. This could be an op-
tion for a system like the United States, where income inequality among
individuals is high, but income disparities among regions are not. In Eu-
rope, harmonizing the welfare systems of highest-income with lowest-in-
come countries is virtually impossible.
An alternative to reducing the scope of the welfare state is protection-
ism—that is, restricting the influx of immigrants. Such a measure means
relinquishing the benefits of migration, just like tariffs and import restric-
tions hamper the possible gains from trade. Nevertheless, this is a measure
chosen by virtually all countries in the world in some form or another. The
permissible quantities of labor migration are usually set in the fashion of a
centrally planned economy by the central government in the form of quotas.
A proposed compromise that combines maintaining the welfare state and
reaping the benefits of migration is to decentralize migration management.
Instead, sponsorship schemes awarding residence permits to holders of a
work contract, and mandatory social insurances for immigrants could con-
stitute such a middle-ground.77
76. A.O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an
Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 158, 158–200 (Warren F. Schwartz ed.,
2007).
77. See Trebilcock, supra note 14.
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The literature on inter-jurisdictional competition proposes several solu-
tions to the problem of welfare-reducing migration. Such measures can be
taken either at a decentralized level of government or, on the contrary, on
an international, supra-jurisdictional level. Economic theory favors legal in-
terventions when there are externalities.78 Such an intervention internalizes
the externality and thus ideally provides for an optimal allocation of re-
sources. If there is an externality due to international migration, then the
intervention needs to take place at the supra-national level—that is, through
an international agreement (as there is no higher authority that can impose a
rule). Such an agreement should favor migration while addressing the po-
tential reasons for inefficiencies.
The economic literature on migration, which looks at the problem from
the national perspective rather the systems competition point of view, con-
tains several policy suggestions to improve immigration laws. For example,
in 1987, Julian Simon suggested auctioning off visas.79 Similarly, Gary
Becker’s 1998 proposal was to sell visas instead of using the quota system
currently in place in the United States and other places.80 These proposals
have been criticized for ignoring the fact that borrowing against one’s
human capital is difficult due to the moral hazard and information asymme-
try problems involved.81 Apart from these incentive problems, the case
against such measures can be made from a different perspective.
For one, what might make sense economically speaking might never-
theless pose serious problems for non-economists. In fact, many of the pro-
posals suggest the establishment of two types of citizens—those with a
right to welfare payments and those who first have to earn their right to live
in a jurisdiction and then are subject to discriminatory measures such as
mandatory insurance schemes or restricted access to welfare systems or la-
bor markets. Second, the inter-jurisdictional competition literature, starting
with Tiebout,82 sees the act of moving as the primary mechanism through
which the efficient allocation of resources is achieved. It is nevertheless
also worthwhile to look not only at the “exit” aspect (in the sense of Alfred
O. Hirschman),83 but also the “voice” aspect—that is, how individuals can
improve institutions without leaving. In some instances, voice might actu-
ally be a superior mechanism to exit.
78. ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (6th ed. 2011).
79. Julian L. Simon, The Price of Citizenship: Auctioning Immigration Visas Helps Foreign-
ers and Americans Alike, 39 POL’Y REV. 71, 71–72 (1987).
80. GARY BECKER & GUITY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF LIFE: FROM BASEBALL TO AFFIRM-
ATIVE ACTION TO IMMIGRATION, HOW REALWORLD ISSUES AFFECT OUR EVERYDAY LIFE 58–59
(1st ed. 1998).
81. Trebilcock, supra note 14, at 309–10.
82. See Tiebout, supra note 45.
83. See, e.g., HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY, supra note 49.
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V. EXIT AND VOICE
A. Generally
The discussion of systems competition emphasizes migration as a
means of “exit” in the sense of Alfred O. Hirschman. By voting with their
feet, migrants control the performance of the state. They move towards a
jurisdiction that provides a better bundle of taxes and public goods. This
perspective is one typical of economists’ view of the market. If a customer
is not satisfied by the service provided by a company, he or she stops using
it and shifts his or her demand to a different company providing a better
product. The inter-jurisdictional competition literature is therefore generally
biased towards exit. Political scientists, on the other hand, have emphasized
the importance of protest against the current state of affairs.84 Combining
these two views—that is, the economic and the political mechanism—can
be useful for the analysis or design of a constitutional order, which is where
legal science comes in.
The exit mechanism is a reaction to a decline in quality. In order to
function, it can require two types of individuals in any given jurisdiction.
The first type Hirschman calls “alert.”85 These are the members of an or-
ganization (in our case, a jurisdiction) who observe the decrease in quality
and react to it immediately. If all individuals were of this type and immedi-
ately recurred to exit, then—in this very stylized example—everybody
would leave the jurisdiction, rendering any improvement obsolete. It is thus
necessary to have a group of “inert”86 members who give the organization
the necessary time to recuperate. Exit as a mechanism has a shortcoming. It
is not useful in situations in which the decline in quality affects all possible
choices. So, for example, if all jurisdictions suffer from an increase in
crime, corruption, environmental decay, or similar, then exit is not an op-
tion. This is an argument for more liberal migration laws, as freer migration
increases the ability of individuals to spread risk—that is, to shield them-
selves against phenomena affecting several places where they could live.
Furthermore, exit is costly, and the ideal location might simply not exist.
Constant migration in search of this elusive place might thus be futile.
The other mechanism is voice. It is often seen as a residual—that is, it
is used by those for whom exit is not an option. When exit is completely
impossible, as was the case in Eastern European socialist countries, then
voice needs to carry the entire burden of improving the system. As men-
tioned earlier, exit is costly. In fact, the population group most likely to
migrate away (particularly in developing countries) is the middle class. For
the lower classes, migration can be too expensive, and their low level of
skills will usually not lead to an improvement in quality of life in another
84. Id. at 30.
85. Id. at 24.
86. Id.
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country. For the upper class, migration might mean giving up their status of
members of a country’s elite. Improving the voice mechanism can thus con-
stitute a substantial welfare-increase. The exit mechanism can actually
prove detrimental to the development of a voice mechanism.
Hirschman notes two determinants of when members of a group will
resort to voice even though exit is in principle possible. First, exit can pro-
vide a granted improvement, while the overall effect of voice on the quality
of an institution is uncertain. Second, individuals need to estimate their ex-
pected ability to influence the organization.87
In general, those individuals who care most about the quality of the
institution are the most likely to engage in voicing their frustration—just as
they are also the most likely to leave. If better-quality substitutes are readily
available, exit is more likely than voice. On a global scale, this means that
individuals in lower-income countries will prefer exit, whereas individuals
in high-income countries will prefer voice, for lack of alternatives. Hirsch-
man also identifies two criteria when a situation in which exit is not an
option is superior to one where exit is limited, but not impossible. First, if
exit “is ineffective as a recuperation mechanism, but does succeed in drain-
ing from the firm or organization its more quality-conscious, alert, and po-
tentially activist customer or members” and second “if voice could be made
into an effective mechanism once these customers or members are securely
locked in.”88 In some situations, namely when the mobile individuals are
most sensitive to quality, exit can remain without affecting performance.
The institution might be comfortable with their exit and simply continue
catering to those who are immobile or insensitive to bad quality. In fact, the
institution has an easier time tyrannizing those who stay.
Finally, Hirschman’s triad is completed by a third element—loyalty.89
Loyalty to an organization, institution, or country can be a reason to refrain
from “exit.” While, for each individual, exit is often the easier option than
voice, loyalty can contribute to redressing the balance. Together with ex-
isting barriers to exit, the effectiveness of voice is reinforced. Restrictions
on migration, as they are in place in all parts of the world, and for many
immigrants, these restrictions act as precisely this kind of barrier to exit. In
other words, with no possibility of escaping, individuals are left with no
other option than to use voice as an instrument to improve their fare.
The type of reaction caused by a decline in the quality of institutions is
not necessarily the same as the one to which the institution is primarily
sensitive. A government might be more likely to react to a revolt than to an
exodus, although the latter might be a more common recourse in certain
situations (e.g., in authoritarian countries, it is easier to flee than to rebel).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 55.
89. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY, supra note 49, at 76.
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In the 1970 model, exit and voice were counteracting forces. Deterioration
leads to discontent, but because exit is cheaper, it undermines voice (the so-
called “simple, ‘hydraulic’ model”).90 Numerous examples from economic
and social life were given, including the Turner or Frontier thesis named
after historian Frederick Jackson Turner,91 which explains the absence of a
strong workers’ movement (a voice mechanism) in nineteenth-century
America with the possibility of exploring opportunities on the Frontier in
the West.92
Hirschman applied his original model primarily to firms and organiza-
tions, but less to national politics. Although voice is a central element in
democracies, exit is a rather marginal factor and contributed little to the
performance of the state.93 The situation in Eastern Europe during socialist
times was a big exception though. The exodus of around two million East
Germans to the West between 1949 and 1961, together with the suppression
of an uprising in 1953, led to hermetic closure of the borders and the build-
ing of the Berlin Wall. That is, the government of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) actively responded to exit by suppressing it. Exit was a
real option for those who dared to illegally cross the border because West
Germany would automatically grant the right to citizenship to East German
refugees (this option was not available to citizens of other socialist coun-
tries like Poland or Czechoslovakia). It was also a perceived option for
many, although the most common form of “exit” was not to escape, but to
turn on the western Germany evening news on television (this was possible
in the GDR because it had a neighboring country speaking the same lan-
guage). In addition, forced exit was a strategy used by the authorities—
dissidents and opponents of the regime were frequently expelled from the
GDR. As a result of these possibilities of exit (voluntary or involuntary),
opposition in the GDR did not develop in the same way and to the same
extent as in the rest of the Eastern Bloc.
Yet during the turmoil of 1989, which lead to the collapse of the GDR
and subsequent German unification, exit and voice were complementary,
Hirschman notes.94 Already the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 can
be interpreted not only as a measure against exit but also as a strong state-
ment of power not to tolerate voice. Starting from the spring of 1989, East
Germans were able to leave the country and flee to the West through
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which lifted their international travel restric-
tions. This sudden loss of authority and inability to prevent exit resulted in
90. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and the GDR, supra note 49, at 176.
91. See generally FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1920) (explaining the absence of a strong worker’s movement in 19th century America with the
possibility of moving to the Frontier in the West).
92. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and the GDR, supra note 49, at 107.
93. Rogers Brubaker, Frontier Theses: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in East Germany, 18 MIGRA-
TION WORLD 12, 12–17 (1990).
94. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and the GDR, supra note 49, at 177.
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the first rallies for reform in East Germany since the bloodstained crack-
down on protestors in 1953. The mass exodus turned exit from a private,
silent action to an act taking place in the public sphere—the gatherings of
large crowds willing to leave the country favored public protests both for
the right to leave, as well as for reform inside the country. Eventually, voice
and exit did not lead to the recovery of the failing regime, but to the ulti-
mate price—namely, the end of the GDR.
It is important to note that migrants’ countries of origin—just like in
the example of the GDR—are often autocratic states. If emigration deci-
sions can be categorized by a push-pull dichotomy,95 then it is also impor-
tant to look at push factors. Emigration can be seen as an involuntary
response to the local political culture.96 In this model, individuals who
would be better off in their home countries are pushed out because they are
politically too far away from the political core—that is, the autocrat or
clique that grants privilege. For instance, individuals who are not cronies of
the ruler might not be granted necessary licenses or quotas for imports or
exports, or are being discriminated against by banks or the educational sys-
tem.97 The least privileged have the greatest incentives to emigrate. De-
pending on the specifics of the country, these non-privileged people can be
the most productive in the population (the case of “brain drain”).
B. The Voice of Migrants
Any constitutional order for migration should address this question of
voice. There have been attempts to reconcile the voice aspect with the inter-
jurisdictional competition literature. It can be argued that inter-jurisdictional
competition is inherently tied to an intra-jurisdictional governance problem.
If we distinguish between individuals who are generally more mobile than
others, and those for whom it is more costly to migrate, then the latter are in
a higher need of constitutional protection. This is an argument for giving
certain residual control rights (that is, over constitutional provisions) to the
immobile.98 This is an argument for restricted voting rights for migrants,
but it does not take into account the sometimes dire situation of migrants.
Once they leave their home country, migrants are in a peculiar situa-
tion. In their destination country, they are a member of society, but are not
voters and are thus limited in shaping policies. Depending on the country,
the naturalization process, and thus obtaining full voting rights, can take
many years (usually between five and ten), with years of study usually not
95. Klaus F. Zimmermann, European Migration: Push and Pull, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WORLD BANK ANN. CONF. ON DEV. ECON. 313, 313–42 (2014).
96. Gil S. Epstein, Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, The King Never Emigrates, 3
REV. DEV. ECON. 107, 107–21 (1999).
97. Id. at 108.
98. Klaus Heine, Interjurisdictional Competition and the Allocation of Constitutional Rights:
A Research Note, 26 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 33, 33–41 (2006).
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counting towards the residence requirement.99 Considering that migration is
often not permanent, but linked to job mobility, this constitutes a serious
disenfranchisement, especially if a migrant moves to another country more
than once. After a long-term stay in a country, an immigrant might find it
beneficial to acquire citizenship of his or her host country. Yet many coun-
tries do not allow for double nationalities, which means that if individuals
decide to return to their country of origin, then they will find themselves
again in a situation of disenfranchisement. Reacquiring their original citi-
zenship is not always straightforward, and can take a substantial amount of
time and effort.
Voting rights for non-citizen immigrants are the exception to the afore-
mentioned situation. Within the European Union, EU nationals are allowed
to vote at the municipal level at the place of their residence, even if this is
not in their country of citizenship. For elections of the European Parliament,
EU citizens can choose whether to have their vote count in their country of
citizenship or in the country of residence. In both cases, they can only vote
for the parties listed on the ballot of the country they chose (European elec-
tions are, by-and-large, organized on the national level, with no truly pan-
European electoral campaigns or parties).
Depending on the legal rules in place in their country of origin, they
might still be able to more or less easily exert voting rights in their country
of citizenship. In the United Kingdom, for instance, this right expires after
fifteen years of staying abroad.100 Yet this voting right is only of limited
use, as permanent residents in a country other than that of their citizenship
are hardly affected by the laws or policies of the latter. Such restrictions on
voting rights curb the possibilities for migrants to exert “voice” and partici-
pate in the political process. If migration is seen as a costly process (due to
the necessary adjustments), then relying solely on the “exit” mechanism
might be a sub-optimal outcome.
CONCLUSION
Despite the general consensus in the economic literature that migration
is beneficial, the specific institutional design under which it takes place af-
fects the direction and scope of the welfare effect. Migration policy is often
analyzed from a unilateral perspective of the receiving state. However, it is
important to keep in mind the multi-layeredness of this multi-faceted prob-
lem and that every jurisdiction is embedded in larger, dynamic systems in
which migration potentially takes place. Migration can be regulated by a
99. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DOUGLAS B. KLUSMEYER, CITIZENSHIP TODAY:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 22 (2001).
100. Representation of the People Act, § 1(3)(c) (1985) (U.K.). For an example of an unsuc-
cessful challenge of this rule on the basis of EU freedom of movement rights, see Preston v.
Wandsworth Borough Council and Lord President of the Council, [2011] EWCH (Admin.) 3174
(Eng.).
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variety of instruments—not only immigration laws, but also through wel-
fare laws, bilateral agreements, and wider constitutional orders, such as the
EU. It is therefore important to analyze the functioning of all these factors
at the same time. A constitutional economics perspective can contribute to
finding the optimal allocation of regulatory power to the different levels of
government.
There is an important lesson from revisiting Hirschman’s Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty—namely, that exit alone is not a sufficient mechanism to im-
prove failing institutions. In that sense, a broader constitutional order shall
not only facilitate exit in the Tieboutian sense, but also ensure the possibil-
ity of voice. Furthermore, it is important to encourage both exit and voice at
a stage when they are still instruments of improvement and not just signs of
abandonment.
